86145-5

SUPREME COURT NO. _____
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 28868-4-III

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

BRANDON SCOTT CORISTINE,

Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR SPOKANE COUNTY

The Honorable Michael P. Price

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Statutes

Other Authorities

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Petitioner Brandon Scott Coristine asks this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals referred to in section B.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals decision in *State v. Coristine*, COA No. 28868-4-III, filed May 19, 2011. The decision is attached at Appendix.

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Brandon Coristine the constitutional right to control his own defense by affirming the trial court's jury instruction, over Coristine's objection, that Coristine had the burden to prove an affirmative defense?

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the affirmative defense instruction did not shift the burden of proof to Coristine?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Brandon Coristine shared a Spokane home with his fiancée and various other friends and family members. 1RP at 37; 2RP at 249-50; 3RP[1] at 304-05. A new roommate, L.F. joined the household. 2RP at 78-

[1] 1RP - January 11 and 12, 2010
2RP - January 13, 2010
3RP - January 14 and 19 , March 3, 2010

79. L.F.'s first night at the house coincided with a party for Coristine and his fiancée. Most everyone was drinking.

During the party, L.F. was "extremely flirting" with Coristine. 3RP at 350. She attempted to grab his groin area and his leg and tried to kiss him once. 3RP at 350. She wanted him to come upstairs to her bedroom and have sex with her after the party. 3RP at 352.

L.F. went to bed early. 2RP at 92. As she was going to bed she said, "I'm passing out, good night." 1RP at 45. During her testimony, L.F. could not recall how much she had had to drink. 1RP at 91. When she went to bed, she felt like she was getting drunk and had the "spins." 1RP at 92.

As he was falling asleep, Coristine heard a loud noise upstairs above his room. 3RP at 354. He went upstairs to check on everyone. 3RP at 355. He noticed that L.F.'s door was open. 3RP at 355. L.F. grabbed Coristine, he lost his balance, and fell into her room. 3RP at 355. L.F. asked Coristine to have sex with her. 3RP at 355. Coristine initially told her "no" but ultimately relented. 3RP at 355-56. L.F was very participatory. 3RP at 357.

L.F. described the sex differently. During her testimony, she claimed little memory of anything. 2RP at 99. She "just remembered coming to and realizing my pajamas were around my knees and realizing

something wasn't right." 2RP at 98. She called a friend and ended up going to the hospital to get a rape kit done. 2RP at 102. DNA results confirmed that she and Coristine had sex. 2RP at 111, 195-208.

The prosecutor charged Coristine with second degree rape alleging that L.F. was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. CP 1; RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b).

Before the trial began, defense counsel told the court that Coristine's defense was that the state could not prove that L.F. was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. 1RP at 27-27. That defense was born out by Coristine's testimony that L.F. was the sexual aggressor. 3RP 355-56.

During the post trial discussion about jury instructions, the trial court proposed giving WPIC 19.03, the affirmative defense to second degree rape. 3RP at 394-95. That instruction reads,

> It is a defense to the charge of rape in the second degree that at the time of the acts the defendant reasonably believed that [L.F.] was not mentally handicapped or physically helpless.
>
> The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established the defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty as to this charge.

CP 20 (Court's Instruction 13); See RCW 9A.44.030(1).

The prosecutor sided with the court and asked that the affirmative defense instruction be given. 3RP at 395-98. Coristine objected:

> MR. COMPTON: First of all, an element of the crime as it's been charged is that [L.F.] was incapacitated. Therefore, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [L.F.] was incapacitated. It's been our defense that in fact she was no incapacitated. The mere fact that she may have had some alcohol does not necessarily make you incapacitated. That instruction I think would be more applicable where you had a fact pattern where, in fact, we concede, yes, [L.F.] was incapacitated, however, it was reasonable for Mr. Coristine to have believed that, in fact, she was not. But from our point of view, she was, although drinking, still capable of realizing what was going on and engaging in that behavior that may have affected her judgment, but that does not means she's incapacitate and that's why we took such pains to talk about her behavior at the party, about why she slurred words, that sort of stuff. So I think we have to be careful about shifting the burden of proof because that's what that instruction does. So from our point of view she was not incapacitated therefore and, of course, they engaged in sexual relations. It was consensual but, of course, if it wasn't consensual we would be talking about rape of another form but I think that's how the consent form fact fits into this fact pattern.

3RP 397-98.

Despite Coristine's objection, the court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense. 3RP at 399.

The jury was also given Court Instruction 9 that lists the elements for second degree rape.

> To convict the defendant of the crime of rape in the second degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
>
> (1) That on December 7, 2008, the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with [L.F.];

> (2) That the sexual intercourse occurred when [L.F.] was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated;
> (3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
>
> If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
>
> On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

CP 16.

The jury found Coristine guilty but not until it had deliberated "for at least two full days." 3RP at 460; CP 24. Coristine was sentenced to a minimum of 78 months and a maximum term of life.[2] CP 27, 29.

Coristine made two arguments on appeal. First, he argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to control his own defense by instructing the jury on the "reasonable belief" affirmative defense over his objection. Brief of Appellant at 11-14. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals broke new legal ground in Washington by answering that Coristine had no right to control his own defense as "the [affirmative defense] instruction was required" Slip. Op at 1.

Second, Coristine argued that by forcing the "reasonable belief" affirmative defense instruction on him, the trial court unconstitutionally

[2] See RCW 9.94A.507

shifted the burden of proof to him. Brief of Appellant at 15-19. Coristine sought to defend the charges by making the state prove the one disputed element: that L.F. was incapable of consent because she was physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. But by forcing the "reasonable belief" instruction on Coristine, the trial court required Coristine "to prove only that he believed [L.F.] was not mentally incapacitated or physically helpless." Slip. Op. at 6. This effectively shifted the burden by insinuating to the jury that there was sufficient evidence of L.F.'s mental incapacity or physical helplessness and it was Coristine's duty to disprove it.

E. REASON WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

BECAUSE THIS CASE INVOLVES SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT REVIEW.

In holding that it was fair to force Coristine to defend his case in a manner not of his choosing, the Court of Appeals went where no Washington court has gone before. It announced a new rule of law. It is now the trial court, and not the defendant, who decides how to defend against a criminal charge. This change in the law is constitutional error and merits review under RAP 13.4(b)(2), (3).

In affirming the trial court's decision to force an affirmative defense on Coristine, the Court of Appeals, Division Three, ignored the

Division Two opinion in *McSorely. State v. McSorely*, 128 Wn. App. 598, 116 P.3d 431 (2005). McSorely was charged with luring. McSorely testified and denied the allegations thus requiring the state to prove each element of the offense. Over McSorley's strenuous objection, the trial court gave an affirmative defense instruction at the behest of the prosecutor. McSorley argued that he had a right to control his own defense. The trial court gave the instruction nevertheless. An appeal followed conviction. McSorely argued that he had a constitutional right to control his own defense. The *McSorely* court agreed and reversed the conviction. *State v. McSorely*, 128 Wn. App. 598, 116 P.3d 431 (2005).

> In *State v. Jones,* 99 Wn.2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983)], the Washington Supreme Court considered whether a trial court could compel a defendant to raise and rely on the affirmative defense of insanity. Answering in the negative, the *Jones* court expressly recognized that every competent defendant "has a constitutional right to at least broadly control his own defense." [*Jones,* 99 Wn.2d at 740, 664 P.2d 1216]. Reasoning that a defendant's right to raise or waive the defense of insanity should be no different from a defendant's right to assert or waive other defenses like alibi or self defense, the *Jones* court observed that "courts do not impose these other defenses on unwilling defendants." [*Jones,* 99 Wn.2d at 743, 664 P.2d 1216]. Reasoning from *Faretta v. California* [422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)], in which the United States Supreme Court held that "the California courts [had] deprived [Faretta] of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense" when they had refused to accept his knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself rather than to have counsel, [*Faretta,* 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525] the *Jones* court stated:

> The language and reasoning of *Faretta* necessarily imply a right to personally control one's own defense. In particular, *Faretta* embodies "the conviction that a defendant has the right to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount." [*Jones*, 99 Wn.2d at 740, 664 P.2d 1216 (citations omitted) (quoting *United States v. Laura*, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.1979))].
>
> Reasoning from *North Carolina v. Alford* [400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)], in which the United States Supreme Court held that the North Carolina courts had properly permitted Alford to plead guilty (and thus to waive all possible defenses) based on the State's evidence rather than his own admission of guilt, the *Jones* court commented that "[courts] should not force *any* defense on a defendant in a criminal case." [*Jones*, 99 Wn.2d at 740, 664 P.2d 1216 (quoting *Alford*, 400 U.S. at 33, 91 S.Ct. 160) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).]

Based on *Jones*, *Faretta*, and *Alford*, the *McSorely* court held that neither the State nor the trial court could constitutionally compel a defendant to raise or rely on the affirmative defense. The court reversed McSorley's conviction. *McSorely*, 128 Wn. App. at 604-05. Moreover, in Coristine's case, Division Three should have followed the precedent set by Division Two in McSorely. It failed to do so and this Court should accept review on that basis. RAP 13.4(b)(2), (3).

Even though the Coristine court did not discuss *McSorely*, it does discuss and attempt to distinguish *Jones* on which *McSorely* relied in part. *Jones*, 99 Wn.2d 735. But the court's analysis is flawed. In *Jones*, the court sua sponte believed that Jones had a viable insanity defense without which he was likely to be convicted. Over Jones' objection, the court

entered a not guilty by reason of insanity plea for Jones without inquiring if Jones desire to forgo the NGI plea was intelligent and voluntary. In this respect, the *Jones* trial court's mistake was to insert itself into the role of decision-maker for Jones. In its effort to distinguish *Jones*, the Coristine court permitted the trial court to make the same mistake made in Jones – to overstep its bounds and become a decision maker for Coristine. The Coristine court failed to see that the issue in *Jones* was not that Jones made no personal showing that he was insane. It was that the court overstepped it bounds in making defense decisions for Jones. Here, the trial court similarly overstepped it bounds when it interpreted Coristine's defense as anything other than what Coristine wanted it to be. i.e., that the state failed to prove the case.

Additionally, the affirmative defense instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Coristine. As a matter of due process of law, the state bears the burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). An instruction which relieves the state of the burden of proof is constitutional error. *See e.g., State v. Cronin*, 142 Wn.2d 568, 14 P.2d 752 (2000). As constitutional error, it is harmless only if "it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." *Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S.

1, 18, 119 S.Ct.1827, 44 L.Ed. 2d 35 (1999), (quoting *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). Under *Neder* and *Chapman,* the error could not be harmless in this case.

Here, *if* Coristine had some reason to believe that L.F. was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless but still reasonably believed that she was capable of consenting to sex, the affirmative defense instruction would have permitted the jury to acquit him if they found his testimony convincing.

Coristine, however, testified that L.F. was the sexual aggressor and that he had no reason whatsoever to believe that she was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. Under these circumstances, the jurors must have interpreted the affirmative defense instruction as requiring Coristine to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that L.F. was apparently mentally incapacitated or physically helpless but that he nonetheless reasonably believed that she was capable of consenting to sex. This is what the instruction directed him to do:

> It is a defense to a charge of rape in the second degree that at the time of the acts the defendant reasonably believed that [L.F.] was not mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.
>
> The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it more probably true than not true. If you find that

the defendant has established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty as to this charge.

CP 20.

Since there was no evidence for the jury to consider whether Coristine *reasonably believed* that L.F. was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless when they had sex, the instruction entirely shifted the burden to Coristine to establish the innocence of his actions by a preponderance of the evidence. Given the marked difference between L.F.'s self-described essentially comatose state and Coristine's description of L.F. as the sexual aggressor, the jurors might well have had a reasonable doubt even if they did not conclude that Coristine had proved his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury obviously struggled to return a verdict because they deliberated "for at least two full days." 3RP at 460.

It cannot be said that the erroneous instruction did not contribute to the verdict. The Court of Appeals erred in finding otherwise in violation of the state's constitutional obligation to prove all the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

F. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should accept review and reverse Coristine's conviction. RAP 13.4(b)(2),(3).

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June 2011.



LISA E. TABBUT/WSBA #21344
Attorney for Brandon Scott Coristine

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on June 20, 2011, I caused to be placed in the mails of the United States, first class postage pre-paid, a copy of this document addressed to: (1) Mark Lindsey, Spokane County Prosecutor's Office, 1100 W. Mallon Ave., Spokane, WA, 99260-2043; (2) Brandon S. Coristine/DOC#337530, Washington State Penitentiary, 1313 13th Ave. Walla Walla, WA 99362, and (3) the original emailed to the Supreme Court.



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APPENDIX

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. BRANDON S. CORISTINE, Appellant.	)	No. 28868-4-III Division Three PUBLISHED OPINION

SWEENEY, J. — This appeal follows a conviction for second degree rape. The State alleged, and its evidence showed, that the victim was not capable of consent because she had been drinking to excess. The defendant's evidence showed that the victim was capable of consent and included the defendant's own perception that he reasonably believed that the victim was capable of consent. The court then, over the defendant's objection, instructed the jury that it was an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed that the victim was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless. We conclude that the instruction was required by the evidence in this record, was not inconsistent with the defendant's defenses, and would be harmless in any

event because the jury concluded that the victim was incapable of consent and the defenses were certainly consistent. We therefore affirm the conviction.

FACTS

L.F. began renting a room in a house where six other people lived on December 6, 2008. That night, the housemates invited friends over and had a party. L.F. drank alcohol with several of her new housemates and their friends. She went to bed when she started to feel drunk. One of her new housemates, Brandon Coristine, checked on her to see if she needed a garbage can. L.F. said she was fine and fell asleep.

The next thing L.F. remembered was someone pulling her pajama pants down and having sex with her while she was lying on her stomach, drifting in and out of consciousness. She felt disoriented for 10 or 15 minutes and then realized that someone had raped her. But she did not know who raped her because she had been "passed out, drunk." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 107. She walked across the hall to a room shared by two female housemates and talked about what had happened.

L.F. went to the hospital the next day for a sexual assault examination. Mr. Coristine learned what she was doing, called her while she was at the hospital, and told her, "I think it was me, I'm sorry. I was really drunk. I thought you wanted it." RP at 108. Test results from that exam confirmed that Mr. Coristine had had sex with L.F.

The State charged Mr. Coristine with second degree rape alleging that L.F. "was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1. Mr. Coristine admitted at trial that he had sex with L.F. but said it was her idea.

Mr. Coristine testified on his own behalf as did his wife, Ashley Coristine, and his wife's sister, Tricia Van Dusen. All testified that L.F. did not get drunk at the party. They testified that L.F. flirted with Mr. Coristine throughout the night, that she repeatedly put her arms around him, touched his leg, grabbed his groin, and invited him upstairs for sex. And they testified that Mr. Coristine refused her advances.

Mr. Coristine testified he went to bed after the party ended but then heard a loud noise and went to check each bedroom. He testified that, when he got to L.F.'s bedroom door, she pulled him inside and begged him for sex. He testified that he refused at first but eventually gave in. He described L.F. as "[p]erfectly conscious and well aware of what was going on, forming perfect sentences." RP at 356. He said she was involved in the sexual encounter and was never unconscious. And he testified that she helped him pull her pants down and take his pants off, asked him how he wanted her positioned, and told him afterwards that she enjoyed it. He said he "had no reason to believe that she would" accuse him of rape. RP at 356.

The court proposed to instruct the jury on the statutory defense (RCW 9A.44.030(1)) that Mr. Coristine reasonably believed L.F. was not mentally incapacitated when they had sex. Mr. Coristine argued that his defense was that the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that L.F. had been incapacitated. The trial court overruled Mr. Coristine's objection and instructed the jury on the "reasonable belief" defense. RP at 399, 409-10.

In his closing argument, Mr. Coristine argued that the State had the burden of proving that he committed second degree rape and that he had no obligation to prove that he did not do it. He argued that the State alleged he had sex with an incapacitated person but that the evidence showed the opposite was true, she was not incapacitated. Mr. Coristine argued that L.F. was not drunk, that she flirted with him, and that she was "quite capable of participating, did participate and was not incapacitated" when they had sex. RP at 442.

The jury found Mr. Coristine guilty.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Coristine contends the trial court should not have given the jury the "reasonable belief" instruction because (1) the instruction shifted the initial burden of proof to him, (2) the instruction amounted to a comment on the evidence, (3) the

evidence did not support the instruction, and (4) he did not want to assert a "reasonable belief" defense.

Whether or not the court properly instructed the jury to consider Mr. Coristine's reasonable belief of L.F.'s capacity to consent is a question of law that we will review de novo. *State v. Pirtle*, 127 Wn.2d 628, 656, 904 P.2d 245 (1995).

The State had to prove that (1) Mr. Coristine had sex with L.F., (2) the act occurred when L.F. was incapable of consent by reason of being mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, and (3) the act occurred in Washington. RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b). And the court so instructed the jury. RP at 397; CP at 53. But it is a defense to second degree rape, an affirmative defense, if "at the time of the offense the defendant reasonably believed that the victim was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless." RCW 9A.44.030(1). Here, the State showed that L.F. was incapable of consent. Mr. Coristine's evidence showed that she was capable of consent and also that he reasonably believed she was capable of consent.

Mr. Coristine maintains that this instruction shifted the initial burden of proving L.F.'s incapacity to him. The instruction did not shift the burden of proof. *State v. Powell*, 150 Wn. App. 139, 157 n.12, 206 P.3d 703 (2009). The court in *Powell* concluded that a "reasonable belief" instruction does not shift the initial burden of proof to a defendant because the instruction becomes relevant only *after* the jury has found that

the State proved each element of the rape charge. 150 Wn. App. at 157 n.12. Indeed, the "reasonable belief" instruction did not require Mr. Coristine to prove that L.F. was not mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. It required him to prove only that he believed she was not mentally incapacitated or physically helpless even though, and only after, the jury was convinced that she was. His evidence happened to show both.

Also, the instruction was a correct statement of the law and was therefore not a comment on the evidence. RCW 9A.44.030(1); *In re Det. of R.W.*, 98 Wn. App. 140, 145, 988 P.2d 1034 (1999). And, again, the instruction became relevant to the jury only after it found Mr. Coristine had sex with L.F. while she was mentally incapacitated and incapable of consent. Indeed, it may well have been error not to give the instruction. *Powell*, 150 Wn. App. at 156-57.

Mr. Coristine also argues that the instruction was not supported by evidence. His argument ignores the bulk of his presentation to the jury. He denies offering evidence that he reasonably believed L.F. was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless. That is not the way we read this record. He and the witnesses who testified on his behalf all testified at some length about L.F.'s conduct that night. A reasonable inference from this testimony is that not only did Mr. Coristine reasonably believe L.F. was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless but also that everyone else should have so believed.

Mr. Coristine and Ms. Van Dusen said L.F. was not drunk. And Mr. Coristine testified that L.F. was "[p]erfectly conscious and well aware of what was going on, forming perfect sentences. I had no other reason to believe that she would do anything like this to me." RP at 356. In fact, he maintained that L.F. initiated the sex. RP at 356. This evidence supports a "reasonable belief" instruction. *In re Pers. Restraint of Hubert*, 138 Wn. App. 924, 929, 932, 158 P.3d 1282 (2007). Indeed, the failure to give the instruction might well have been error; it certainly would have compromised the legal implications of Mr. Coristine's evidence of his reasonable belief.

Any error, even if we were to assume error, would be harmless in any event. There is no inconsistency between Mr. Coristine's defense theories and therefore no prejudice attends the affirmative defense. *See State v. Jones*, 99 Wn.2d 735, 748, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) (where two defense attorneys wound up arguing conflicting defense theories). Again, the "reasonable belief" instruction did not come into play until after the jury found each element of second degree rape. Thus, even without the instruction, the jury would have found Mr. Coristine guilty, and there is sufficient evidence in this record (L.F.'s testimony) to support that finding.

Here, the jury also had to consider the reasonableness of Mr. Coristine's impressions after it concluded that the victim here was not capable of consent. And he would have been entitled to acquittal based on his showing of reasonable belief if the jury

had believed his evidence. He, then, supplied the factual predicate for the instructions but did not want the legal implications of that factual predicate. That distinguishes this case from *Jones*, 99 Wn.2d at 748-49. There, the defendant intended to make no showing that he was insane. The court nevertheless forced him to do so by sua sponte entering an insanity defense and then instructing on an insanity defense. *Jones*, 99 Wn.2d at 748-49. Here, Mr. Coristine presented substantial evidence that his impressions of L.F.'s level of sobriety were reasonable. But the jury was not persuaded.

In sum, there was substantial evidence offered by Mr. Coristine and witnesses on his behalf that contradicted the State's showing that she was not capable of consent. But his evidence also clearly addresses a second and just as important line of defense, an affirmative defense, that even if the State proved L.F. was incapacitated, the jury should still acquit because Mr. Coristine reasonably believed, indeed had every reason to believe, that she could consent. Both theories were before the jury based on the evidence, and the court correctly instructed the jury on both.

We affirm the conviction.

Sweeney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Korsmo, A.C.J.

Brown, J.

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Subject: Petition for Review for Brandon Scott Coristine

I am filing this on behalf of indigent client Brandon Scott Coristine. An Order of Indigency is on file. He is in DOC and remains indigent.

State of Washington v. Brandon Scott Coristine, No. 28868-4-III
--- no Supreme Court number assigned yet

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